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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Roy Roland Araiza, Sr., appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession
of a controlled substance, methamphetamine. He filed a motion to suppress, which was
denied. He subsequently entered into a conditional plea which preserved his right to
appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. Mr. Araiza now appeals and he asserts
that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The following facts were found by the district court concerning Mr. Araiza's
motion to suppress:

Late on January 13, 2013, into the early hours of January 14,

2013, Mr. Araiza was stopped on suspicion of operating a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol.
(R., p.140.)

(R., p.140.) Officer Kevin Loosli responded with his drug dog.

Prior to running the dog around the vehicle and while Mr. Araiza was

performing field sobriety tests with another officer, Officer Loosli noticed a yellow pill
imprinted with the number "230" on the driver's seat. (R., p.140.)
Officer Loosli testified that the pill resembled a prescription pill and not an overthe-counter pill.

(R., p.140.)

He also testified that people who have prescriptions

generally keep their pills in the prescription bottle while those illegally possess
prescription pills do not.

(R., p.140.)

Officer Loosli retrieved the pill without asking

permission from Mr. Araiza. (R., p.140.) The pill was confirmed to be Oxycodone by a
drug identification search on the internet.

(R., p.140.) Mr. Araiza never produced a

prescription for the pill. (R., p.140.)
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Mr.

vehicle was then searched and officers found methamphetamine.

(R., p.140.) At the time of the incident, Mr. Araiza was on probation and had agreed to
certain conditions, including:
The defendant shall consent to a search of his/her person, residence,
vehicle, personal property, and other real property or structures owned or
leased by the defendant or for which the defendant is the controlling
authority conducted by any agent of the Idaho Dept. of Correction or law
enforcement officer. The defendant waives his/her Fourth Amendment
Rights concerning searches.
(R., p.141.)
Mr. Araiza was charged with two counts of possession of a controlled substance
- one count for methamphetamine/amphetamine and one count for Oxycodone.
(R., p.49.) The

later amended the information

allege that Mr. Araiza was a

persistent violator. (R., p.86.) Mr. Araiza filed a motion to suppress. (R., p.76.) The
district court denied the motion, holding that the search was permitted by Mr. Araiza's
probation agreement, and, alternatively, that Officer Loosli lawfully seized the pill
because it was contraband in plain view, which provided probable cause to search the
vehicle. (R., p.139.)
Mr. Araiza eventually entered into a plea agreement in which he entered an
Alford plea to possession of methamphetamine and preserved the right to appeal from
the denial of the motion to suppress. (R., pp.233, 243.). The district court imposed a
sentence of five years indeterminate. (R., p.264.) Mr. Araiza appealed. (R., p.267.) He
asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress.
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Araiza's motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Araiza's Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Mr. Araiza asserts that the prescription pill was not clearly contraband and thus

was improperly seized and then tested. He also asserts his probation agreement did
not permit the search in this case.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision

on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings

fact which

were supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of
constitutional principles to the facts as found.

State v. Atkinson, 1

Idaho 559, 561

(Ct. App. 1996).

C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Araiza's Motion To Suppress

1.

Plain View/Probable Cause

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, and
provides that search warrants must be based upon probable cause. Warrantless
searches and seizures are considered unreasonable per se unless they come within
several judicially prescribed exceptions to the warrant requirement.

Coolidge v. New

Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). Under the automobile exception, police may search
an automobile and the containers within it when they have probable cause to believe
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that the automobile contains contraband or evidence of a crime. State v. Gibson, 141
Idaho 277, 281 (Ct. App. 2005).
The plain view doctrine is also one of those exceptions. "The doctrine, simply
stated, is that if a police officer is where he has a right to be, and he sees something in
plain view, the observation is not a search and the ensuing seizure ordinarily is not
subject to Fourth Amendment strictures." State v. Rusho, 110 Idaho 556, 558 (Ct. App.
1986).
The plain view doctrine contains three requirements.

First the officer lawfully

must be in a position from which he can view the relevant area or object. Coolidge,
U

. at 465-468. Second, if the officer

that position due to an intrusion (albeit

lawful) into a place where a privacy interest exists, he must have acted for a valid law
enforcement purpose other than to view the object or area in question. This is
occasionally, and perhaps inaccurately, called the "inadvertent discovery" requirement.
State v. Bussard, 114 Idaho 781,788 n. 2,760 P.2d 1197, 1204 n. 2 (Ct. App. 1988).

Third, the observed item must have an immediately apparent connection with criminal
activity. State v. Holman, 109 Idaho 382, 707 P.2d 493 (Ct. App. 1985).
An officer may draw reasonable inferences based on his training and experience
in determining whether this connection exists. In Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983),
an officer saw a green party balloon on the floor of an automobile. The officer seized the
balloon, finding it to contain heroin. The Supreme Court upheld the seizure upon the
plain view doctrine, stating that the balloon's connection with criminal activity was
immediately apparent to a trained officer. The Court explained that the "immediately
apparent" requirement means that an officer must have a probable basis to believe an
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in

item is connected with criminal activity. Id. at 741

Court concluded

that such a probability existed because the officer

saw vials with a white

powder in the car, the officer knew balloons were used to carry narcotics, and the
"distinctive character of the balloon itself spoke volumes as to its contents .... " Id. at 743.
Mr. Araiza did not contest the stop, and thus does not challenge the officer's right
to be where he was when he saw the pill.

He does, however, challenge the

"immediately apparent" requirement. And because the pill's connection to illegal activity
was not immediately apparent, its discovery did not provide the probable cause
necessary to search the vehicle.
was pointed out by trial counsel,
is nothing in [the officer's] testimony that would verify the concept
that he was able to identify this particular pill as a prescription medication.
He says it's yellow. It has an imprint. But he has no specific training that
would permit him to identify it as a prescription medication; and as a
matter of fact, he was not able to even say today what medication he
believed it was, whether it was a prescription or not. But again, he clearly
did not even ask much less know that Mr. Araiza did or did not have a
prescription for that medication.
(5/14/13 Tr., p.32, L.14 - p.33, L.1.) Counsel was exactly right. Officer Loosli had no
idea what the medication was when he seized it.

When addressing this issue, the

district court noted that Officer Loosli testified that, based on his training and
experience, when pills are possessed under a prescription, the pills are usually in or
near a prescription bottle and when they are possessed without a prescription, the pills
are loose or in a container without a prescription. (R., p.151.) The court then held that,
"such observations, coupled with on-the-job experience, would give a person of
reasonable caution a strong assumption that the pill was contraband." (R., p.151.) The
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later found that Officer Loosli had probable cause to

the pill was

. (R., p.153.)

The court analogized the instant situation to that of a drug dog sniff, stating that,
"considering that a drug dog's alert of the presence of the odor of drugs - whether or
not drugs are actually present - in a vehicle is sufficient for probable cause to search
the vehicle, this court believes that an officer's perception of a loose pill appearing to be
a prescription pill on the driver's seat provides probable cause the pill is contraband."
(R., p.152.)

Mr. Araiza submits that this is a poor comparison. A drug dog alerts to specific
drugs that, by their nature, are contraband. Possessing a prescription pill is not illegal.
It is only illegal if there is no prescription, and Officer Loosli did not even

Mr. Araiza

if he had a prescription. Under the district court's analysis an officer could see a blood
pressure or cholesterol pill in a vehicle and, without more, have probable cause to
search the vehicle.

Additionally, Officer Loosli testified to no specific training with

regard to how prescription medications are stored; his assertions are essentially
hunches. Officer Loosli's seizure of the pill was illegal, and the fact that the pill was
indeed a prescription pill did not provide probable cause to search the vehicle. Because
Officer Loosli's conclusions about the pill are nothing more than hunches, Mr. Araiza
submits that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress.

2.

Probation Agreement/Waiver

"Searches conducted pursuant to the supervision of probationers and parolees
are another exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and art. I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution." State v. Devore,

7

1

Idaho 344,

P.3d 153, 1

1, 736 P.2d 1

App. 2000) (citing State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho

(1987). A search by a probation officer will be deemed reasonable

and an exception to the Fourth Amendment if "(a) he has reasonable grounds to believe
that the probationer has violated some condition of probation and (b) the search is
reasonably related to disclosure or confirmation of that violation." State v. Pinson, 104
Idaho 227, 233, 657 P.2d 1095, 1101 (Ct. App. 1983).

However, "[t]he 'reasonable

grounds' requirement for warrantless searches by probation or parole officers does not
apply when the subject of the search has entered into a probation or parole agreement
that includes a consent to warrantless searches." Devore, 134 Idaho at 347, 2 P.3d at

157 (citing Gawron, 112 Idaho at 843, 736

at 1297).

In this case the district court held that the search was authorized by both the
consent agreement and by the Fourth Amendment waiver. (R., pp.142-49.) The district
court erred on both counts.

a.

Consent

When determining whether a search is valid pursuant to a probation agreement,
one must look to the language of the agreement.

The Idaho Supreme Court first

addressed this issue in State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho 841, 842 (1987). In Gawron, the
defendant entered into the following agreement:
That probationer does hereby agree and consent to the search of his
person, automobile, real property, and any other property at any time and
at any place by any law enforcement officer, peace officer, or probation
officer, and does waive his constitutional right to be free from such
searches.
Id. at 842 (1987).

'That order indicated that Gawron had certified to a reading and

understanding of the terms of the order, and that he accepted those terms and signed
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the

" Id. In Gawron, officers searched the defendant's residence while he was

not present and found contraband and proceeds of burglaries. Id. The Idaho Supreme
Court held that the search was authorized by the agreement because it was a complete
waiver. Id.
In State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207 (2009), the order of probation contained
conditions that the defendant "submit to random blood, breath and/or urine analysis
upon the request of the Court, his probation officer or any law enforcement official"; and
(2) he "shall submit to searches of personal property, automobiles and residence
without a search warrant at the request of his probation officer." On appeal, Purdum
argued that his consent was limited to random evidentiary testing and not to a seizure of
his person for such testing. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed. Id.
More recently, however, the Court of Appeals found a search was not authorized
by the terms of a probation agreement. In State v. Turek, 150 Idaho 745, 746 (Ct. App.
2011 ), the agreement stated that the defendant was required to "[s]ubmit to searches of
his/her person, residence, and any property under his/her control, without a warrant
pursuant to probation supervision, at the request of the Probation Officer or Law
Enforcement." The issue in Turek was, "[w]hether a probation condition which requires
that a probationer submit to warrantless searches "at the request of' a probation officer
or law enforcement officer requires that the probationer be notified of the search and/or
consent at the time of the search ... " Id. at 749. The Court of Appeals concluded that,
"a probation condition that requires a probationer to submit to a search 'at the request
of' an officer' requires that the probationer be informed of an officer's intent to conduct
an impending search." Id. at 752.
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As he did in the district court,

Araiza submits that the agreement in this case

is more similar to the agreement in Turek than in Gawron.

Counsel for Mr. Araiza

explained:
The difference between the two cases is simply this. In the Gawron case,
there was a fixed and definite waiver by the defendant of all searches and
seizures. There was no requirement that he consent. There was no
language that he shall submit.
In the Turek case there was indeed that language; and what the Court of
Appeals said was, indeed he has waived his right. If he is asked to give
his consent to search the vehicle or the residence, then he shall do so.
But in that case, Your Honor, there was no request, much like this case,
where the officer simply conducted a search and then later tried to justify it
based on consent.
In that particular instant, the Idaho Court of Appeals was saying this. He
couldn't refuse, once you asked him. But you t1ave to ask him. And he
has to consent if you have, in fact, requested that you search his vehicle,
his home, whatever.
(5/13/14 Tr., p.34,

- p.35, L.18.)

As set forth above, the agreement in this case states,
The defendant shall consent to a search of his/her person, residence,
vehicle, personal property, and other real property or structures owned or
leased by the defendant or for which the defendant is the controlling
authority conducted by any agent of the Idaho Dept. of Correction or law
enforcement officer. The defendant waives his/her Fourth Amendment
Rights concerning searches.
(R., p.141.)

Unlike Gawron, the agreement in this case states that Mr. Araiza "shall

consent." The agreement in Gawron stated that the defendant, does "hereby agree and
consent." The agreement here requires Mr. Araiza to consent in the future, it does not
state that he agrees and consents at the time of the agreement. Mr. Araiza submits that
the phrase, "shall consent" is essentially the same as language in Turek that the search
be "at the request" of an officer. As such, an officer must ask for consent. Pursuant to
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the agreement, it would be a probation violation
must

refuse that consent, but consent

given.
The district court in this case found the agreement more similar to Purdum than

Turek.

The court held that, "if the phrase 'shall submit to . . . upon the request"

constitutes a express waiver even when no request is made, then Araiza's condition
"shall consent to" is correspondingly an express waiver as to searches." (R., pp.14647.)
Mr. Araiza acknowledges the similarities between the two agreements, but notes
there is an important distinction.

Purdum required the defendant to "submit" to a

search, and the agreement in this case requires Mr. Araiza to "consent." These words
are not synonyms. "Submit" means "to give over or yield to the power or authority of
another (often used reflexively)." See http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/submit?s=t
(last visited October 8, 2014). Consent means, "to permit, approve, or agree; comply or
yield." See http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/consent?s=t (last visited October 8,
2014). Further, the issue of whether Mr. Purdum had been adequately notified of the
search was not litigated in Purdum.
Mr. Araiza thus submits that his case is closest to Turek, and the agreement
required the officer to request consent before searching the vehicle.

Because the

officer did not request this consent, Mr. Araiza asserts that the vehicle search was
illegal and evidence found in the search must be suppressed.
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b. Waiver
The district court also held that the final sentence in the agreement constituted a
waiver of Mr. Araiza's Fourth Amendment rights and denied the suppression motion on
that basis. (R., pp.148-19.) With regard to waiver, counsel for Mr. Araiza argued,
[The agreement] says nothing about his rights under the Idaho
Constitution, Your Honor. He waives his Fourth Amendment rights. What
does that mean? I don't know.
If it said, [Mr. Araiza] waives all of rights to an illegal search and seizure
under the Fourth Amendment and Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution,
that might be more meaningful. But there's nothing in this case to indicate
that [Mr. Araiza] ever waived his rights under the Idaho Constitution.
(5/13/14 Tr., p.41, Ls.3-13.) Counsel was exactly right. The final sentence of
Mr. Araiza's agreement states, "The defendant waives his/her Fourth Amendment
Rights concerning searches." It contains no waiver of any rights pursuant to the Idaho
Constitution.

The district court held that, "the argument that somehow Araiza could

waive his Fourth Amendment rights and not the identical rights under the Idaho
Constitution is unavailing and - as both cover the same areas - would mean that the
Fourth Amendment waiver is meaningless if the Idaho rights remain." (R., p.149.)
Accepting Mr. Araiza's argument might mean that the Fourth Amendment waiver
is essentially meaningless in this case, but that is not a basis to deny a suppression
motion. 1 And the fact that the rights are nearly identical is irrelevant.

Mr. Araiza is

guaranteed his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by two
sources - the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of

1

It would not make the waiver meaningless altogether, as a defendant is required to
cite to the Idaho Constitution in order to assert to those rights in a suppression motion.
Thus, a defendant who moved to suppress only on the basis of a Fourth Amendment
violation would not be able to assert Idaho constitutional protection.
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Idaho

and he only waived the rights from one source.

Had the

to waive the rights protected by both of these sources, it could easily have
done so in the agreement.

It did not.

Further, to the extent that the agreement is

ambiguous, ambiguous contacts are construed against the drafting party.

See, e.g.,

Barber v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 677, 680 (1997).

Because

Mr. Araiza did not waive any rights pursuant to the Idaho Constitution and moved to
suppress on the basis of a violation of the Idaho Constitution, the district court erred by
holding that he waived his right to challenge the search in this case.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Araiza respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order of
judgment and commitment and reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress.
DATED this 9 th day of October, 2014.

JUSTIN M. CURTIS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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